There can be, I submit, no Islamic truths of economics any more than there could be Islamic laws of Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, or Medicine.5 Economics must be treated as an empirical social science governed by the standard scientific method appropriate to its nature, scope and limits. As a science all its theories, conceptual models, mathematical projections and predictions of mass behaviour and social-economic implications of fiscal policies will have to be empirically tested for their validity or truth. All pre-conceived notions, assumptions, untested hypotheses, will hamper the economist's task of analyzing the motives, structure and implications of general economic behaviour.

The above task implies a neutral phenomenological analysis of economic concepts, practices and systems (just as a natural scientist analyses natural phenomena) rather than the justification of any pre-rational conviction concerning any particular economic concept or practice including usury/interest. I submit even a committed Muslim economist qua social scientist, should do the same instead of assuming that interest is the root of all economic or social evils.

If I, as a Muslim, be inwardly convinced that interest must be evil (since the Quran prohibits it), but do not temporarily suspend this belief while rationally examining the issue, my judgment would not be impartial but rather 'weighted' against interest. Even when I consciously aim to find out the truth rather than to defend any particular view, my perception of the function and utility of interest would be colored by my antecedent beliefs. Likewise, if I have been conditioned by my milieu to hold all religion or pre-modern ideas as infantile myths or as superstitions, I may miss out on some crucially relevant consideration or aspect of the issue. Suspension of belief is, thus, indispensable for a truly detached and balanced approach. To the extent I fail in doing so I shall become selective—noting or emphasizing some features but missing out or ignoring others, thereby confirming my initial slant. However, if I could empty or neutralize my ideological affiliations and predilections or 'ideological vested interests' as it were (as far as humanly possible), I would maximize the clarity of my thoughts and grasp the complex contours of the issues concerned.

I am not suggesting that the social scientist ought to or actually can do away with assumptions about human nature or with moral values. In fact, the committed Muslim ought not, and never can lightly treat the Quranic prohibition against ‘riba’. All I say is that while analyzing and appraising economic concepts and practices, the social scientist must suspend or put in 'brackets' (as the German thinker, Husserl says) all one's preconceived notions and endeavour to discover the structures and interconnections of events or entities and one's own authentic value judgments. If this is not done, one is very likely to be advancing bad reasons for justifying what one takes to be the one and only right interpretation of Scripture. When this happens, all theoretical arguments turn into self-deception.4

Suspension of belief for the duration of the enquiry does not imply rejecting the antecedent belief which might, possibly, even get confirmed as a result of the enquiry. If so, no problem of the conflict between faith and reason would arise. If, however, any conflict does arise the individual remains free to make a well considered choice. If one chooses the verdict of faith he would not be inclined to 'rationalize' (in the pejorative sense), but merely claim that this course gives him a 'total satisfaction' which he values more highly than mere ‘rational satisfaction'. And this would be a very valid stand to take, provided, of course, his sense of 'total satisfaction' is not tainted with fear or doubts.  There is nothing objectionable in opting for faith after passing through the discipline of Husserl’s ‘epoche’. Likewise, there is nothing wrong if the person goes ‘where the argument leads him’ via the method of Socrates after passing through a struggle between the pull of faith and the pull of reason, provided the final choice is the fruit of authentic freedom rather than of fear, greed, or some hidden motive

The fear of loss of traditional faith should not stand in the way of the person's quest for authentic being-- his inner journey to reach 'the truth of his being' rather than 'the truth of his milieu'. Even if the believer loses his traditional faith or rather its traditional interpretation, this is not necessarily to lose his valuational roots or his spiritual identity, unless, of course, his free enquiry brings about a total rejection of his initial beliefs and values. Should this happen the honest seeker must have passed through a profound inner struggle. And the experience of deep spiritual unrest and honest enquiry yields the pure gold of human authenticity in the crucible of spiritual suffering.

In the final analysis, authenticity or authentic being, irrespective of its contents, is the highest possible mode of human existence. This authentic being is attainable, both by the autonomous philosopher and by the man of faith who has reached the condition of 'blessedness’ in the spiritual sense. In practice, however, authentic being appears to be more difficult to achieve at the religious level, when one’s religious beliefs or values collide with one’s inner rational choices, and thus lead to inner tensions. However, the autonomous philosopher cannot claim any superiority of status over the religious person who freely and authentically submits to an external Authority, provided their degree of authenticity be the same.